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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER THE ISSUES RAISED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL. 
Baker's brief relies in part on issues which were not presented before the trial 
court below, and which should not be considered for the first time on appeal. "As a 
general rule, claims not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal." 
Peterson v. Sunrider Corp,, 2002 UT 43, n. 12, 48 P.3d 918 {citing State v. Holgate, 2000 
UT 74,1| 11,10 P.3d 346; Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996)). "Utah 
courts have consistently followed a policy strongly opposed to the raising of issues for the 
first time on appeal." Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 758 P.2d 451, 456 (Utah Ct. App.1988). 
Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has stated on a number of occasions, "As a general rule, 
we will review issues raised for the first time on appeal only if exceptional circumstances 
or 'plain error' exists." Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994). 
Therefore, those issues raised only now for the first time on appeal should not be 
considered by this Court. Because the argument sections I, IV and V of Baker's brief and 
the argument section II of the brief of Amicus Curiae, the Utah Trial Lawyers Association 
("UTLA") present issues for the first time, they should not be considered by the Court. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A. No Claim was Made and the Record Does not to Support a Claim That "The 
Arbitration Agreement Does Not Comply with Statutory Requirements." 
In section I of her brief, Baker introduces for the first time her claim that "The 
agreement could not have been enforced against Mr. Baker." (Appellee Brief at p. 4.) 
However, in addition to this claim being without merit, there is nothing in the record to 
justify raising this issue for the first time on appeal. Indeed, Baker herself acknowledges 
that "this argument was not relied upon below." (Appellee Brief at p. 4.) 
Ostensibly recognizing the well-established authority which precludes issues from 
being considered for the first time on appeal, Baker cites to the rule that "a trial court 
decision may be affirmed 'on any ground available to the trial court, even if it was not 
relied upon below.'" (Appellee Brief at p. 4.) However, Baker confuses the "affirm on 
any ground" rule of appellate review with the general rule that "issues not raised [in the 
district court] cannot be argued for the first time on appeal, and this rule applies to 
constitutional questions." State v. Hodges, 2002 UT 117, f 5, 63 P.3d 66. 
As the Utah Supreme Court has pointed out, "While we acknowledge the existence 
and validity of the 'affirm on any ground' rule of appellate review, we caution that it is a 
tool available only in limited circumstances." Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, n. 3, 52 
P.3d 1158 (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has clarified that "an appellate 
court may affirm the judgment appealed from 'if it is sustainable on any legal ground or 
theory apparent on the record.'" Id. at f 13 (emphasis in original). However, "In the 
limited circumstance that an appellate court chooses to affirm on an alternate ground, it 
may do so only where the alternate ground is apparent on the record." Id. at \ 20 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(emphasis added). The alternate ground raised for the first time on appeal is not apparent 
on the record, and Baker's new argument is just the type of argument where the "affirm 
on any ground" rule should not be applied. 
If, in any way, the ground or theory urged for the first time on 
appeal is not apparent on the record, the principle of affirming 
on any proper ground has no application. To hold otherwise 
would invite the prevailing party to selectively focus on issues 
below, the effect of which is holding back issues that the 
opposition had neither notice of nor an opportunity to address. 
Because of this due process component, "apparent on the 
record," in this context, means more than mere assumption 
or absence of evidence contrary to the "new" ground or 
theory. The record must contain sufficient and 
uncontroverted evidence supporting the ground or theory to 
place a person of ordinary intelligence on notice that the 
prevailing party may rely thereon on appeal. 
State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149-50 (Utah Ct. App.1997) (emphasis added). * 
No challenge to the validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement signed 
by Mr. Baker was presented. Although not raised before the trial court, Mrs. Baker now 
states that the arbitration agreement statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-17, provides that an 
arbitration agreement is "not enforceable unless the patient is given, 'in writing and by 
verbal explanation,' six specified items of information." (Appellee Brief at p. 5). Baker 
goes on to claim that: 
No verbal explanation was given. Defendants, whose burden 
it was to present evidence establishing the existence of a valid 
agreement, presented no evidence other than the written 
agreement itself. This Court should, therefore, presume 
that no evidence exists that the verbal explanation was 
given. It is unlikely that defendants could have presented 
the necessary evidence. 
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(Appellee Brief at p. 5, emphasis added). However, Baker failed to make any challenge 
before the trial court concerning the evidence of a valid and enforceable agreement. 
Baker's own claims demonstrate that her newly raised issue is not apparent on the record 
because she invites the Court to "presume that no evidence exists," and speculates that 
"[i]t is unlikely that defendants could have presented the necessary evidence." (Appellee 
Brief at p. 5.) Moreover, Mr. Baker's death makes it impossible to secure his testimony 
in this matter. Issues that require the Court to presume a lack of evidence or speculate as 
to a party's ability to present evidence on "an argument [that] was not relied upon below" 
are issues that are not apparent on the record, and which are improper for consideration. 
"Although we 'may affirm' a trial court's ruling on grounds not raised below, we do not 
find the record sufficient to properly consider this issue." See In re Sheville, 2003, UT 
App 141,13, 71 P.3d 179 (citing State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 149 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997) (emphasis in original). 
Therefore this Court should not apply the "affirm on any ground"rule as the record 
is not sufficient and there is not uncontroverted evidence to support Baker's new theory 
that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable. Instead, the Court should follow its well-
established precedent and decline to consider this argument that Baker raises for the first 
time on appeal. 
Even were the Court to address whether a valid arbitration agreement existed, the 
record supports only a finding that a valid enforceable arbitration agreement exists. In 
fact, Dr. Rosenthal's statements before the trial court included that "Mr. Baker expressly 
4 . Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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affirmed that he understood and voluntarily entered into the agreement." (R. 15.) 
Similarly, Baker never challenged or objected to the assertions of IHC Health Center -
Holladay and Dr. Stevens that "It is not disputed that a valid, enforceable arbitration 
agreement exists." (R. 23.) Despite ample opportunity before the trial court, Baker did 
not object to any of the numerous statements in the record pertaining to the validity and 
enforceability of the arbitration agreement 
Moreover, Baker erroneously states the burden of proof, claiming that "Defendants 
had the burden to establish the existence of a binding arbitration agreement." (Appellee 
Brief at p. 4), However, under the applicable statute the burden would have shifted to 
Baker to present evidence that no valid arbitration agreement existed because Mr. Baker 
had signed a written acknowledgment. Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(3) (Supp. 2002), 
provided: 
A written acknowledgment of having received a written and 
verbal explanation of a binding arbitration agreement signed 
by or on behalf of the patient shall be a defense to a claim that 
the patient did not receive a written and verbal explanation of 
the agreement as required by Subsection (1) unless the 
patient: 
(a) proves that the person who signed the agreement 
lacked the capacity to do so; or 
(b) shows by clear and convincing evidence that the 
execution of the agreement was induced by the health care 
provider's affirmative acts of fraudulent misrepresentation or 
fraudulent omission to state material facts. 
Article 7 of the arbitration agreement sets forth Mr. Baker's written acknowledgment. (R. 
35.) Thus, the burden was on Baker to either prove that Mr. Baker lacked capacity or to 
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show by clear and convincing evidence that fraud was involved. The clear and 
convincing evidence standard has been described in Utah as follows: 
That proof is convincing which carries with it, not only the 
power to persuade the mind as to the probable truth or 
correctness of the fact it purports to prove, but has the 
element of clinching such truth or correctness. Clear and 
convincing proof clinches what might be otherwise only 
probable to the mind. . . . But for a matter to be clear and 
convincing to a particular mind it must at least have reached 
the point where there remains no serious or substantial 
doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. 
Jardine v. Archibald, 279 P.2d 454, 457, 3 Utah 2d 88 (Utah 1955) (quoting Greener v. 
Greener, 212 P.2d 194, 204-205, 116 Utah 571 (Utah 1949) (emphasis added; omission 
in original; internal quotes omitted)). 
The record is devoid of proof that Mr. Baker lacked the capacity to enter into the 
agreement or clear and convincing proof of any fraud. Thus, Baker's newly raised claim 
that there was no enforceable agreement fails as a matter of law even were the Court to 
consider it. 
B. Constitutionality was Not Raised Below, and Should Not be Considered By 
This Court 
Attempts to raise constitutional challenges for the first time on appeal should also 
fail. As previously set forth, "Under ordinary circumstances, appellate courts will not 
consider . . . a constitutional argument, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial 
court committed plain error." State v. Helmick, 2000 UT 70, | 8, 9 P.3d 164. This Court 
has further stated: "[A]s the court of appeals has correctly observed on several occasions, 
'the proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and probing analysis of state 
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constitutional interpretation is before the trial court, no t . . . for the first time on appeal.'" 
State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, n. 3, 69 P.3d 1278 {citing State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 
1273 (Utah Ct. App.1990) (ellipses in original quotation)). 
As in the instant case, efforts to raise constitutional challenges involving due 
process and the Open Courts provision have been claims have been rejected when raised 
for the first time on appeal. For example, in Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals court noted, 
Bunch suggests that this interpretation of the statute renders it 
unconstitutional under Article I, Sections 7 and 11 of the 
Constitution of Utah. Bunch never presented these arguments 
to the trial court, but raises them for the first time on appeal. 
To assert constitutional claims on appeal, parties must 
generally assert them first in the trial court. In State v. Bobo, 
803 P.2d 1268 (Utah Ct. App.1990), this court declared that 
"the proper forum in which to commence thoughtful and 
probing analysis of state constitutional interpretation is before 
the trial court, not, as typically happens . . . for the first time 
on appeal." 
Bunch v. Englehorn, 906 P.2d 918 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
"With limited exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline 
consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal." Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. 
ofEduc, 797 P.2d 412,413 (Utah 1990). However, neither Baker nor UTLA has 
presented any evidence in the record of plain error or exceptional circumstances, or even 
claimed that such circumstances exist. Therefore, Baker should not be allowed to raise 
new issues for the first time in her appellate brief, and the Court should decline to 
consider them. 
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C. Neither Baker Nor UTLA Have Complied with the Provisions of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-33-11 Requiring Notice to the Attorney General in Order to 
Challenge the Constitutionality of a Statute 
It is inappropriate at this time for Baker or Amicus Curiae UTLA to seek 
declaratory relief regarding the constitutionality of the Arbitration Act. In its Brief of 
Amicus Curiae UTLA claims that "if Mr. Baker's arbitration agreement is deemed to be 
binding on Mrs. Baker because of its consonance with the Utah Arbitration Act and the 
Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, then those statutes violate the Utah Constitution." 
(Brief of Amicus Curiae UTLA at p. 28) (emphasis added). UTLA goes on to claim: 
Assuming arguendo that the defendants are correct in their 
interpretation of those statutes, their argument does not require 
reversal of the trial court's decision holding that Mrs. Baker is 
obliged to arbitrate her statutory claims. Instead, their argument 
requires this Court to invalidate those statutes as violative of the 
Utah Constitution. 
Id. (emphasis added). UTLA's claim challenges the validity of the Utah Arbitration Act 
and the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act. However, it is "the well-settled rule that an 
amicus brief cannot extend or enlarge the issues on appeal." Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 
627, 629 n. 3 (Utah 1983) {citing In re Woodward, 14 Utah 2d 336, 337, 384 P.2d 110, 
111(1963)). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11 provides that "if a statute . . . is alleged to be invalid 
the attorney general shall be served with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be 
heard." (Emphasis added.) 
It is also well established that "[t]he form of the verb used in a 
statute, i.e., something 'may,' 'shall' or 'must' be done, is the 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
single most important textual consideration determining 
whether a statute is mandatory or directory." 
"According to its ordinary construction, the term 'may' means 
permissive, and it should receive that interpretation unless 
such a construction would be obviously repugnant to the 
intention of the Legislature or would lead to some other 
inconvenience or absurdity." The term "shall," on the other 
hand, "is usually presumed mandatory and has been 
interpreted as such previously in this and other jurisdictions." 
State ex rel M.C, 940 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citations omitted). "The 
meaning of the word shall is ordinarily that of command." Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 
P.2d 728, 729 (Utah 1974). Thus, notice to the attorney general is mandatory. "This 
mandatory language leaves no discretion to the court." Lyon v. Burton, 2000 UT 19, \ 76, 
5 P.3d 616. No constitutional challenge of a statute can be commenced until proper 
service is given. 
In Parker v. Rampton, 497 P.2d 848, 852-53 (Utah 1972), the Utah Supreme 
Court, while discussing Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11, clarified that the "interests of the 
State and the Attorney General in sustaining the validity of enactments of the legislative 
branch of government are recognized in [U.C.A. § 78-33-11]" and cited Ethington etal 
v. Wright et al, 189 P.2d 209 (Ariz. 1948), which "indicates that when the validity of a 
statute is challenged the Attorney General should be a party." 
Since UTLA claims that "if Mr. Baker's arbitration agreement is deemed to be 
binding on Mrs. Baker because of its consonance with the Utah Arbitration Act and the 
Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act, then those statutes violate the Utah Constitution," 
(Brief of Amicus Curiae UTLA at p. 28), UTLA challenges the validity of the Utah 
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Arbitration Act and the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act. As a result, the UTLA is 
required to either give notice by way of service upon the Attorney General or make the 
Attorney General a party to this action. (See Thiokol Chemical Corp. v. Peterson, 393 
P.2d 391 (Utah 1964) ("The Utah Attorney General was served pursuant to Section 
78-33-11, U.C.A.1953, because the validity of the statute is involved.")) However, there 
is no indication that UTLA has fulfilled either of these requirements. Therefore, the 
Court should decline to consider UTLA's constitutional argument because UTLA has not 
fulfilled the proper notice requirements of U.C.A. § 78-33-11 by either serving the Utah 
Attorney General or making the Attorney General a party in this action. (See Jefferson 
County Fiscal Court et al v. Trager, 189 S.W.2d 955 (Ky. 1945) (The court stated that 
declaratory judgment as to the validity of a statute should not be given because the 
Attorney General had not been served.)) 
D. The Arbitration Act is Presumed Constitutional and has been Previously 
Upheld as Constitutional. 
Were the court inclined to consider the constitutional arguments raised for the first 
time on appeal, it should begin with the presumption that the Arbitration Act is 
constitutional. This Court has clearly established such precedent: 
Furthermore, we presume the legislation being challenged is 
constitutional, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor 
of constitutionality. As this court stated in a prior Open 
Courts case: 
The first and foundational [principle of law relating to the 
constitutionality of statutes] is that the prerogative of the 
legislature as the creators of the law is to be respected. 
Consequently, its enactments are accorded a presumption of 
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validity; and the courts do not strike down a legislative act 
unless the interests of justice in the particular case before it 
require doing so because the act is clearly in conflict with the 
higher law as set forth in the Constitution. 
Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center, 2002 UT 134, \ 7, 67 P.3d 436 {citing State 
v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, \ 30, 40 P.3d 611; Utah Sch. Bds. Ass n v. State Bd. ofEduc, 
2001 UT 2, U 9, 17 P.3d 1125; Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78, 80 (Utah 1981); Socy of 
Separationistst Inc. v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993); Lindon City v. 
Engineers Const. Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1073 (Utah 1981)). 
Neither Baker nor UTLA have satisfied their burden regarding their constitutional 
challenge. 
The decisions of this court unanimously support a 
presumption of constitutionality of legislative enactments. In 
determining constitutionality, statutes are presumed to be 
constitutional until the contrary is clearly shown. It is only 
when statutes manifestly infringe upon some constitutional 
provision that they can be declared void. Every reasonable 
presumption must be indulged in and every reasonable doubt 
resolved in favor of constitutionality. 
In re Estate ofBaer, 562 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1977), appeal dismissed sub nom. Baer v. 
Baer, 434 U.S. 805, 98 S.Ct. 35, 54 L.Ed.2d 63 (1977); Furthermore, there is no 
heightened scrutiny in cases involving Open Courts challenges. 
We recognize that on previous occasions involving Open 
Courts challenges this court recognized an exception to our 
well-settled presumption-of-constitutionality standard. We 
submit that this heightened standard of review for Open 
Courts challenges was in error. Any heightened level of 
scrutiny simply because the constitutional challenge is based 
on the Open Courts Clause is improper. 
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Wood v. University of Utah Medical Center, 2002 UT 134, % 8, 67 P.3d 436 (citations 
omitted). 
Moreover, the constitutionality of the Arbitration Act as been previously upheld. 
Baker and UTLA ignore the prior opinions of this Court upholding the constitutionality of 
the Arbitration Act. 
The Territory and State of Utah have had statutory provisions 
for arbitration of disputes since 1884. The policy of our law 
favors arbitration as a speedy and inexpensive method of 
adjudicating disputes. To that end, the Legislature amended 
the Arbitration Act to permit valid and enforceable 
agreements for arbitration of future as well as present 
disputes. We held that amendment constitutional in an 
opinion that reaffirms the strong public policy in favor of 
arbitration as an approved, practical, and inexpensive means 
of settling disputes and easing court congestion. 
Robinson & Wells, P.C v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 1983) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
Specifically, the Arbitration Act has been held to satisfy the constitutional 
provisions of the due process clause. 
Plaintiff contends the amendment violates the due process 
clause of Article I, Section 7, Constitution of Utah. Such an 
argument is not persuasive. In Christiansen v. Harris, this 
Court observed that due process of law does not necessarily 
require judicial action. The purposes of the law, especially as 
to property, may be effected by executive or administrative 
action, and still be valid if they meet the requirements of due 
process. The requirements are 'that no party can be affected 
by such action, until his legal rights have been the subject of 
an inquiry by a person or body authorized by law to determine 
such rights, of which inquiry the party has due notice, and at 
which he had an opportunity to be heard and to give evidence 
as to his rights or defenses. 
12 
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A survey of Chapter 31, Title 78 reveals that the Arbitration 
Act more than fulfills all these requirements. In addition, 
there are provisions for action by the courts to affirm, modify, 
correct or vacate an award. 
Lindon City v. Engineers Const Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 1074-75 (Utah 1981) (emphasis 
added). 
This Court has also found the Arbitration Act constitutional under the Open Courts 
provision. 
In Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070, 
1074 (Utah 1981), we recognized this change in Utah law and 
the constitutionality of the 1977 amendment... The 
legislature responded to the clarion opinions expressed by 
members of this Court and amended the statute [in 1977] to 
permit valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration of 
future disputes. This amendment does not violate Article I, 
Section 11, Constitution of Utah. 
Allredv. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n of Utah, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996) (citing 
Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co., 636 P.2d 1070 (Utah 1981)). 
In any event, the threshold question under Open Courts analysis "is whether the 
statute abrogated an existing remedy or cause of action." Wood v. University of Utah 
Medical Center, 2002 UT 134, ^ f 12, 67 P.3d 436. In the present action, no legal remedy 
has been abrogated. Recognizing that the proper application of the Arbitration Act and 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act requires that Baker be bound by the arbitration 
agreement entered into by her deceased husband does not abrogate Baker's wrongful 
death remedy. Mr. Baker waived the right to judicial resolution of any dispute arising out 
of his health care; he did not give up his right to recover damages for alleged medical 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
malpractice. Thus, the fact that Baker is bound by the arbitration agreement does not 
abrogate the underlying cause of action and therefore does not implicate the Open Courts 
Clause. Arbitration does not affect the remedy, it simply changes the forum for its 
resolution. 
POINT II. 
WRONGFUL DEATH CLAIMS ARE SUBJECT TO DEFENSES AVAILABLE 
AGAINST THE DECEASED, INCLUDING WAIVER OF THE RIGHT TO 
TRIAL. 
Baker claims that a "wrongful death action belongs to the statutory heirs and is 
distinct from any claim owned by the decedent." (Appellee Brief at p. 8.) However, the 
Utah Supreme Court has clarified the "independent" nature of a wrongful death claim: 
We have held that an action for wrongful death is an 
independent action accruing in the heirs of the deceased. 
However, we have not entirely separated the heirs" right from 
the decedent's because the heirs' right is in major part based 
on rights of support, both financial and emotional, that run to 
them from the deceased. Accordingly, we have held that the 
wrongful death cause of action is based on the underlying 
wrong done to the decedent and may only proceed subject to 
at least some of the defenses that would have been available 
against the decedent had she lived to maintain her own action. 
Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 332 (Utah 1997). Therefore, any discussion 
of the "independent" or "distinct" nature of Baker's claims must be qualified by the 
recognition that Utah courts "have not entirely separated the heirs' right from the 
decedent's" and that the appellee "may only proceed subject to at least some of the 
defenses that would have been available against the decedent had [Gary Baker] lived to 
maintain [his] own action." Id. 
14 
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While Utah courts have not identified all of the defenses that heirs are subject to 
for wrongful death claims, Baker goes too far in claiming that these defenses are limited 
to considerations that determine whether a claim exists. (Appellee Brief at p. 10.) Utah 
courts have never made this qualification nor any other categorical generalizations 
regarding defenses available under the wrongful death statute. Instead, the courts have 
proceeded on a specific, defense-by-defense basis. 
In Hirpa v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 948 P.2d 785 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme 
Court allowed the defendant health care providers in a wrongful death medical 
malpractice action to assert the same defenses against the deceased patient's heirs which 
they could have asserted against a living patient plaintiff. In Hirpa, the Court stated: 
Plaintiffs also argue that section 58-12-23 violates Utah 
Constitution article XVI, section 5, the wrongful death 
provision, which states: 
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in 
death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable 
shall not be subject to any statutory limitation, except in cases 
where compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided 
for by law. 
"The plain meaning of the constitutional provision . . . is to 
prevent the abolition of the right of action for a wrongful 
death, 'whether in a wholesale or piecemeal fashion.'" Berry, 
111 P.2d at 684 (quoting Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 667 
(Utah 1984)). Thus, the legislature may not repeal the 
wrongful death statute; neither may it nullify the wrongful 
death action by indirect means. However, "the Legislature 
may enact reasonable procedures for the enforcement of 
wrongful death actions and may provide for reasonable 
defenses that are not inconsistent with the fundamental nature 
of the wrongful death action itself." Berry, 1X1 P.2d at 685. 
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Utah law is clear that a plaintiff in a wrongful death action is 
subject to defenses which could have been asserted against 
the decedent had he lived and prosecuted the suit. Kelson v. 
Salt Lake County, 784 P.2d 1152, 1155 (Utah 1989). The 
Good Samaritan Act is intended to induce licensed medical 
providers to voluntarily render emergency medical aid by 
eliminating their liability. The Act provides that a defense 
can be asserted against a malpractice claim by a living 
plaintiff. That same defense should be allowable in a 
wrongful death action by the deceased patient's heirs. In 
view of this, we think the Good Samaritan Act to be a 
reasonable defense, not inconsistent with the fundamental 
nature of the wrongful death action nor an abrogation of the 
wrongful death action itself. Therefore, it does not violate 
article XVI, section 5. 
Hirpa v. IHCHospitals, Inc., 948 P.2d 785, 794 (Utah 1997) (emphasis added). 
Enforcing an arbitration agreement entered into by Mr. Baker does not conflict 
with the underlying purpose of the wrongful death statute in allowing his heirs to pursue 
their wrongful death claim. The legislative history of the wrongful death statute indicates 
that the "underlying purpose of this statute is 'to provide compensation to those who were 
dependent upon the decedent as a sole or supplemental means of economic and emotional 
support/" Haro v. Haro, 887 P.2d 878, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Dennis C. 
Farley, Note, Decedent's Heirs Under the Utah Wrongful Death Act, 1979 Utah L.Rev. 
77, 80). Through arbitration, the heirs are still able to pursue the wrongful death claim 
for any compensation they may be entitled to receive. Therefore, enforcing the 
decedent's agreement to require arbitration by his heirs does not frustrate the underlying 
purpose of the wrongful death statute because the heirs are still able to pursue their claim 
for compensation. 
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Baker "acknowledges the public policy to enforce all contracts, including 
arbitration agreements" but claims that policy "cannot be used to force arbitration against 
a party without that party's consent." (Appellee Brief at p. 7.) In support of her claim, 
appellee quotes Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 412: 
Generally, the obligation of contracts is limited to the parties 
making them . . . In the case of a written contract, a person 
who is not named in, or bound by, the terms of a written 
contract cannot be rendered liable on it by the mere 
intention that he or she should be bound. 
(Appellee Brief at p. 12, emphasis added.) However, the appellant-defendants are not 
seeking to render Mrs. Baker liable under the "contract." Requiring the plaintiff-appellee 
to arbitrate her claims is not a liability. Nonetheless, Baker claims that "Mrs. Baker was 
not the intended recipient of a 'separate and distinct benefit,' but was arguably the 
intended recipient of a distinct liability." (Appellee Brief at p. 15.) Plaintiff-appellee fails 
to establish how enforcement of the arbitration agreement results in any liability to Mrs. 
Baker. Indeed, it is rather obvious that she is seeking compensation which is clearly not a 
liability but rather a "benefit." 
The mere fact that Baker does not desire to enforce her right to arbitrate her claim, 
and indeed is seeking to avoid arbitration, does not obviate her right to do so which right 
is a direct benefit provided her by the agreement. Instead of dealing directly with the 
existence and reality of this benefit, Baker ignores the benefit and claims that because she 
is not attempting to enforce the arbitration agreement, the agreement cannot be enforced 
as to her to require her to arbitrate her claims. In support of her assertion, she quotes 
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from a federal district court case where a consultant hired by a managing partner of a 
limited partnership sought to hold general partners liable for unpaid wages. The court 
indicated that the "court knows of no rule nor any reason why a third party beneficiary 
should be liable on a contract to which it was not a party." Harper v. Delaware Valley 
Broadcasters, Inc., 743 F. Supp. 1076, 1084 (D. Del. 1990). Baker's reference to Harper 
is not well-taken because, once again, the defendants are not seeking to render Mrs. Baker 
liable on a "contract." Requiring the plaintiff-appellee to arbitrate her claims is not a 
liability. Furthermore, in addition to the cases cited by these appellants in their initial 
brief, federal law also provides for the enforcement of arbitration agreements against third 
party beneficiaries such as Mrs. Baker.1 
lSee e.g. Intergen N. V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 145 (1st Cir. 2003) ("a third-party 
beneficiary of a contract containing an arbitration clause can be subject to that clause and 
compelled to arbitrate."; E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin 
Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2001) ("whether seeking to avoid or 
compel arbitration, a third party beneficiary has been bound by contract terms where its 
claim arises out of the underlying contract to which it was an intended third party 
beneficiary."); Industrial Electronics Corp. of Wisconsin v. iPower Distribution Group, 
Inc., 215 F.3d 677, 680 (7th Cir. 2000) ( "As a third-party beneficiary, Industrial 
Electronics also would be bound by the arbitration provision.",); Gibson v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. 181 F.3d 1163, 1170 n.3 (10th Cir. 1999) ("fact that [plaintiff] did not 
individually sign the Agreement does not preclude enforcement of the Agreement with 
respect to [defendant's claims against her because it is clear that [plaintiff] was, at the 
very least, a third party beneficiary of the Agreement."); MS Dealer Service Corp. v. 
Franklin, Ml F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999) ("exception arises when the parties to a 
contract together agree and upon formation of their agreement, to confer certain benefits 
thereunder upon a third party, affording that party rights of action under the contract.") 
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In addition to the benefit of being able to enforce the terms of the arbitration 
agreement as a third party, Baker received benefits as a result of the agreement. In 
Baker's Complaint, she claims: 
The heirs of Gary Baker have been damaged by the conduct 
of the defendants and are entitled to the following damages: 
(a) For loss of companionship, care, comfort and society, 
consortium and other general damages . . . (b) For all 
economic losses including, but not limited to, loss of support, 
loss of inheritance, funeral expenses and medical expenses. 
(R. at 4, emphasis added.) All of the claimed injuries and damages are benefits that Mrs. 
Baker is claiming that the heirs were 'entitled' to and lost as a result of the defendants' 
alleged negligence. However, the plaintiff-appellee's "entitlement" is based upon the 
benefits of the patient-physician relationship entered into between Gary Baker and his 
medical care providers that was subject to the terms of the arbitration agreement. Mr. 
Baker agreed to arbitrate any medical malpractice claims as a condition for receiving 
medical care. The prospect of improved health and well-being of Mr. Baker, which was 
the object of that medical care, benefitted the heirs by ideally extending and improving 
their opportunity to enjoy Mr. Baker's companionship, care, comfort and society, and 
consortium. Thus, another "distinct and separate benefit" that plaintiff-appellee received 
from the relationship and the associated arbitration agreement is the inverse of her 
claimed damages: the prospect of continued companionship, care, comfort, society, and 
consortium, as well as continued economic support. 
Finally, plaintiff-appellee claims that "some exceptions may allow an arbitration 
clause to be enforced against a nonsignatory, but none of these exceptions apply here." 
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(Appellee Brief at p. 19.) Baker cites five exceptions based upon Texas and Second 
Circuit case law. As set forth in these appellants initial brief, the five exceptions referred 
to by Baker are not the only recognized exceptions. However, one exception cited by 
plaintiff-appellee is the equitable remedy of estoppel. It would be inequitable to permit 
Mrs. Baker to escape the obligations of the arbitration agreement where the health care 
providers were induced to enter into the health care relationship with Mr. Baker by his 
agreement to arbitrate any claims related to the health care provided and where the heirs 
stood to benefit from the care provided to Mr. Baker. The health care providers would 
suffer injury by not being entitled to arbitrate the claims related to the care provided to 
Mr. Baker. 
It is readily apparent from the plain language of the arbitration agreement that Mr. 
Baker intended and contemplated that his spouse and heirs would be third party 
beneficiaries to the agreement and bound by its terms. As previously set forth in these 
appellants' opening memorandum, the application of well established principles of 
contract construction require this conclusion and warrant enforcement of the agreement as 
to Mrs. Baker. The terms of the arbitration agreement indicate: 
We hereby agree to submit to binding arbitration all disputes 
and claims for damages of any kind for injuries and losses 
arising from the medical care rendered or which should have 
been rendered after the date of this Agreement. All claims 
for monetary damages against the physician, and the 
physician's partners, associates, association, corporation or 
partnership, and the employees, agents and estates of any of 
them (herein collectively referred to as "physician"), must be 
arbitrated including without limitation, claims for personal 
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injury, loss of consortium, wrongful death, emotional 
distress or punitive damages. 
Arbitration Agreement, R. 35. It is unambiguous that Mr. Baker's spouse and heirs were 
intended to fall within the scope of the agreement and that any claim arising out of the 
medical care at issue is subject to arbitration. 
We expressly intend that this Agreement shall bind all 
persons whose claims for injuries and losses arise out of 
medical care rendered or which should have been 
rendered by Physician after the date of this Agreement, 
including any spouse or heirs of the patient and any 
children, whether born or unborn at the time of the occurrence 
giving rise to any claim. 
(Arbitration Agreement, R. 35, emphasis added). It is clear from the terms of the 
agreement that with regard to any claims regarding the health care to be proved to Mr. 
Baker, Mr. Baker intended that his spouse and heirs, in addition to himself, enjoy the 
benefits of and be subject to the obligations of the arbitration agreement. Subject to the 
terms of this agreement, the health care providers rendered care to Mr. Baker. 
In this case, Gary Baker's waiver of the right of trial remains a viable defense. 
The arbitration agreement includes a specific, unambiguous waiver to the right to trial. 
Waiver of Right of Trial: We expressly waive all rights to 
pursue any legal action to seek damages or any other remedies 
in a court of law, including the right to a jury or court trial, 
except to enforce our decision to arbitrate, to collect any 
arbitration award and to facilitate the arbitration process as 
permitted by the Utah Arbitration Act. 
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(R. 35.) Such waiver of the right to trial does not abrogate Baker's wrongful death action 
but remains a valid defense to Baker's claim that arbitration is not the proper forum for 
pursuing her wrongful death claim. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Appellants Gregory P. Stevens, M.D. and IHC 
Health Center - Holladay respectfully request that the Court reverse the ruling of the trial 
court and order that arbitration agreement be enforced in this matter. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this £ _ _ day of July 2004. 
BURBIDGE & WHITE 
Larry R. White 
^sQLLJL 
Paul D. Van Komen 
Attorneys for Defendants and Appellants Gregory P. 
Stevens, M.D. and IHC Health Center - Holladay 
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